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Abstract
It is often asserted that separation of legislative powers tends to make legislation both more
moderate (because concessions to all veto players are needed to secure enactment) and less
frequent (because sucient concessions are sometimes infeasible). The formal analysis in this
paper shows this claim to be incomplete, and sometimes incorrect. Although greater separation
of powers makes legislation more dicult to enact, it also makes legislation, once enacted,
more dicult to repeal. Attenuating the threat of repeal means that when one faction has
sucient power to push through extreme policies, it is more likely to do so than would be the
case if legislative power were more concentrated. These two eects cut in opposite directions,
and it is dicult to say, as a general matter, which will predominate. Indeed, increasing the
fragmentation of legislative power may sometimes increase both the expected frequency and the
expected extremism of legislative enactments.
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yProfessor, Harvard Law School, Griswold 509, Cambridge, MA 02138. Email: mstephen@law.harvard.eduTradition has it that in 1789, shortly after Thomas Jeerson returned from France, he and
George Washington were arguing over breakfast about the design of the U.S. Constitution. Jef-
ferson is said to have asked Washington why he had agreed to a bicameral legislature with a
separate Senate. Washington replied by asking Jeerson why he had just poured his coee into his
saucer. \To cool it," Jeerson answered. \Ever so," said Washington, \we pour legislation into the
senatorial saucer to cool it" (Farrand 1966).
Although this story is probably apocryphal, it captures a familiar argument not only for bi-
cameralism, but for the separation of legislative powers more generally. Such separation is thought
to encourage moderation and stability, preventing ill-considered proposals from becoming law, and
indeed reducing the overall frequency of legislative action. Thus James Madison defended bicam-
eralism in Federalist 62 in part by asserting that because \the faculty and excess of law-making
seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable," it made sense to provide for
a second legislative chamber as an \additional impediment ... against improper acts of legisla-
tion." In Federalist 73, Alexander Hamilton made a similar argument in favor of a presidential
veto. According to Hamilton, the President's veto power \furnishes additional security against the
enaction of improper laws" by establishing \a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated
to guard the community against the eects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to
the public good, which may happen to inuence a majority of that body." Hamilton was careful to
acknowledge that the \power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones," but,
like Madison, he argued that on net the \injury that may possibly be done by defeating a few good
laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones."
In making these arguments, Washington, Hamilton, Madison, and other members of the Found-
ing generation were developing an informal (though quite sophisticated) positive political theory of
the separation of powers. Some of their arguments emphasized the particular qualities that the occu-
pants of the dierent oces were likely to possess. So, for example, Representatives would be more
majoritarian, while Senators would be more sober and statesmanlike (Macedo 2009). The Founders
also sometimes contended that separation of powers would foster more deliberation and would help
cultivate civic virtue (Sunstein 1985, 1993b). But there is also a clear strain in their analysis that
focuses simply on the idea that a fragmentation of legislative power would make legislation more
dicult, would require more compromise, and would therefore lead to a more even distribution,
1across political factions, of the benets and burdens of any legislation ultimately enacted (Manning
2001, 2007). Under a unitary system, by contrast, a temporary legislative majority|perhaps under
the inuence of a parochial faction|could enact legislation that benets certain interests (those
holding sway at the moment) at the expense of other groups, or of the general public.
Modern political economy theory has formalized these insights in models that conceive of the
lawmaking process in terms of the distribution of agenda-setting, voting, and veto power (Ferejohn
and Shipan 1990; Krehbiel 1996, 1998; McCarty 2000). A common conclusion in much of this liter-
ature is that an increase in the number of \veto players" (individuals or institutions whose consent
is required to enact a new law) tends to make legislation both more moderate (because a statute's
proponents must make concessions to all veto players in order to secure its enactment) and less
frequent (because sucient concessions to all veto players might sometimes be infeasible) (Cameron
2000; Cooter 2000; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Riker 1992; Tsebelis 2002; Tsebelis and Money 1997).
These models, in other words, seem to conrm the Founders' hypothesis that fragmentation of leg-
islative power will tend to facilitate both moderation (that is, limits on redistribution from one
group to another) and stability (that is, preservation of the status quo). In addition to the more
obvious forms of fragmentation of legislative power in the U.S. Constitution|such as bicameralism
and the presidential veto|other non-constitutional features of the legislative process, such as the
committee system and the use in some instances of super-majority rules (for example, cloture votes
in the U.S. Senate) can have similar eects (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Cutrone and McCarty
2006; McGinnis and Rappaport 2002; Shepsle and Weingast 1987).
Whether (or when) these eects are desirable is hotly contested. As noted above, prominent
members of the Founding generation, including Hamilton and Madison, viewed legislative over-
reaching as a greater danger than legislative inertia, and therefore believed that a separation of
legislative powers was desirable because it would promote limited (federal) government.1 Modern
scholars with a more libertarian bent share this view (Calabresi 2001; Clark 2001; Garry 2008).
1This point should not be overstated. In The Federalist Papers, Madison and Hamilton (and John Jay) were
advocating a Constitution that gave the national government much greater power than it had under the Articles of
Confederation, and many of the arguments in The Federalist emphasized the need for a stronger national government
(McGann 2006). Indeed, in Federalist 22 Hamilton criticized the super-majoritarian features of the Articles of
Confederation as inimical to eective governance. Likewise, in Federalist 58 Madison criticized super-majority voting
rules as giving minorities too much power to thwart desirable legislation or to \extort unreasonable indulgences" in
exchange for acquiescence. Nonetheless, the Founders' belief in the importance of imposing some structural limits
on the national legislature, in order to preserve the prerogatives of the States and the liberty of the people, seems to
have been sincere and deeply held.
2However, at least since the New Deal many critics of the separation of powers have argued that
insucient government action (the result of \gridlock" or \impasse") is often more of a problem
than excessive government action (Landis 1936; Levinson 2006; Sunstein 1993a). Moreover, in-
stitutions that impede legislative activity do not privilege \limited government" so much as they
privilege the status quo, whatever that happens to be (Garrett 2008; McGinnis and Rappaport
2002). If the status quo involves little government regulation, as it arguably did at the time of the
Founding (at least at the national level), then constraining legislative activity indeed has libertarian
consequences, for good or ill. But if the status quo involves a great deal of government regulation,
the fragmentation of legislative power may impede the adoption of deregulatory legislation, with
anti-libertarian consequences (Ackerman 2000; Myers 2008).
This paper does not engage directly with these normative questions. Rather, it addresses
the positive claim, apparently shared by (almost) all sides in the normative debates, that the
fragmentation of legislative power tends, all else equal, to preserve the status quo and to ensure
that if legislation is passed, that legislation is \moderate" in the sense that it distributes benets
widely to a larger number of interest groups or factions, rather than conferring large benets on
some groups and large costs on others. Using a simple formal model, the analysis below shows that
this positive claim is incomplete, and sometimes incorrect.
This result rests on the familiar observation that political actors care not only about enacting
legislation, but about insulating that legislation from future reversal. Indeed, policy insulation is
a prominent theme in the political economy literature. Some of the available insulation techniques
are institutional: incumbents may try to protect their policies from reversal by delegating to a
\hardwired" bureaucracy (Lewis 2003; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987, 1989; Moe 1989, 1990)
or by relying on an independent judiciary to enforce the terms of the original legislative bargain
(Landes and Posner 1975). However, while these techniques may help insulate legislative bargains
against \bureaucratic drift" at the implementation stage, they are less eective in protecting against
\legislative drift," because a future legislature could alter the statute itself (Horn and Shepsle 1989).
Another strategy that incumbents may use to insulate their preferred policies is to adopt statutes
that are somewhat more moderate|that is, less objectionable to the competing factions that might
take power in the future. Policy moderation might achieve insulation in two ways. First, mutual
moderation might be sustainable as a cooperative equilibrium in an indenitely repeated game: each
3major party might explicitly or tacitly agree to adopt moderate policies, and to punish extremism
by its rivals with retaliatory extremism (de Figueiredo 2002; Moe and Caldwell 1994; Stephenson
2003). Second, if legislation (including legislation that amends or repeals a prior statute) is costly
to enact, then a more moderate statute may be more likely to persist simply because the costs
to a rival party of repealing the statute exceed the benets (Givati and Stephenson 2011; Moe
and Caldwell 1994). Thus the implicit threat of repeal in the future may induce moderation in
the present, and may sometimes deter legislation altogether if repeal is suciently likely that the
statute's would-be proponents view the expected benets of pushing for enactment as lower than
the opportunity costs (Ackerman 2000).2
As many scholars have observed, however, separation of powers not only makes it more dicult
to enact a new statute, but also makes it more dicult to repeal or modify an enacted statute (Crain
and Tollison 1979; de Figueiredo 2002; McGinnis and Rappaport 2002; Myers 2008). This means
that incumbents with the power to enact a new statute will worry less about future repeal when
legislative power is more fragmented. Therefore, greater separation of legislative power may produce
two cross-cutting eects on the expected moderation and stability of government policy. First,
greater separation of power increases the likelihood of divided government, which makes legislation
more dicult to enact and encourages compromise. Second, however, greater fragmentation of
legislative power attenuates the threat of repeal. This means that when one faction has sucient
(albeit temporary) control over the government to push through extreme policies in its favor, it is
more likely to do so than would be the case if legislative power were more concentrated.
Because these two eects cut in opposite directions, it is dicult to say, as a general matter,
which eect will predominate. Indeed, as the subsequent formal analysis will show, increasing the
fragmentation of legislative power may increase or decrease both the expected frequency and the
expected extremism of legislative enactments.3 This conclusion implies that many of the standard
2Related research has established that in a dynamic legislative bargaining game where proposers or alternatives
are randomly selected, a proposer might implement a policy that is closer to the ideal point of the median legislator
than the proposer's ideal feasible policy, because the former is more likely to persist for a longer time (Baron 1996;
Penn 2009). These models, however, presume the composition of the legislature is xed (only the identity of the
agenda setter changes), whereas the focus here is on how incumbents might use policy moderation as a response to
the risk of changes in the composition of the legislature.
3Although much of the literature overlooks this observation, two notable exceptions are Ackerman (2000) and
de Figueiredo (2002). de Figueiredo (2002) examines an innitely repeated game in which two interest groups com-
pete for control of the government (a set-up similar to that in Alesina (1987) and related models). He shows that
a cooperative equilibrium, in which each group declines to overturn its rival's programs, can be sustained via pun-
ishment strategies if the benets of cooperation are suciently high and the groups are suciently evenly matched.
4defenses and criticisms of the separation of legislative powers may not be well-founded. Indeed,
under plausible conditions, a unitary, Westminster-style system will tend to produce stasis or com-
promise, while a U.S.-style separation-of-powers system will tend to produce periods of relative
inactivity punctuated by occasional bursts of extreme, and highly controversial, redistributive leg-
islation that reects one faction's agenda rather than a broader political compromise.
The paper is organized as follows. Part I presents the basic model and derives equilibria.
Part II explores how variation in the fragmentation of legislative power|modeled here as the
probability of divided rather than unied government|aects both expected policy stability (that
is, the probability that the government will enact and implement new legislation) and expected
policy moderation (that is, the degree to which the policy outcome protects the interests of those
groups most at risk of suering major costs from new legislation). Part III discusses empirical and
Although de Figueiredo's main interest is in examining the incentive of parties to insulate their policies through
delegation to inecient bureaucracies, he also shows that separation of powers makes a cooperative equilibrium,
based on punishment strategies, more dicult to sustain. Ackerman (2000) makes a somewhat dierent argument
that does not invoke reciprocal punishment strategies. Rather, Ackerman contends that in a Westminster-style par-
liamentary system, the incumbent party has less of an interest in pushing a bold, ideological policy agenda, because
such initiatives are likely to be undone after the next electoral cycle; instead, incumbents will focus on smaller-scale
pragmatic initiatives. In contrast, Ackerman continues, in a separation-of-powers system, the government usually
faces an impasse, but on those rare occasions when one party has full authority, it will try to press its advantage to
maximum extent, rushing through broad, but often largely symbolic, measures consistent with its ideology, knowing
that these measures will be dicult to repeal. There are some important dierences between the analysis developed
in this paper and the arguments of Ackerman and de Figueiredo, but this paper can nonetheless be seen as developing
a similar basic insight.
In addition to Ackerman (2000) and de Figueiredo (2002), a few other notable contributions explore related argu-
ments. For example, Alter and McGranahan (2000) argue that although the Senate libuster requires a super-majority
to pass a new law, the libuster also makes it more dicult to amend a proposed bill, because proposed amendments
can also be libustered. Thus the libuster can shift power from the median Senator to the proposer, and this can
sometimes lead to the enactment of laws that are further from the status quo than the policy that would have pre-
vailed without the libuster. A related argument appears in the literature on judicial independence, which some have
argued can make legislative bargains more durable, thus increasing interest groups' incentive to lobby for favorable
legislation (Landes and Posner 1975; Elhauge 1991).
Another related line of argument builds on the observation, developed in the context of social choice theory, that
super-majority voting rules (or their functional equivalent) can produce stable equilibrium outcomes in settings where
majority rule might otherwise produce intransitive collective preferences. McGann (2006) claims the the stability
induced by super-majority rules is inimical to minorities because it will be harder for them to form new coalitions
to undo adverse outcomes. Thus McGann|making an argument reminiscent of Dahl (1956), Ely (1980), and Miller
(1983)|suggests that in a well-functioning majoritarian democracy there are unlikely to be permanent losers, because
minorities can break apart the majority coalition in the future.
In another related but distinct contribution, Rogers (2003) contends that bicameralism might increase rather than
decrease legislative production. His argument, however, is also quite dierent from the one developed in this paper,
in that Rogers focuses on the fact that a second chamber can originate as well as reject legislation.
Finally, several scholars have argued that a fragmented legislative process may make it dicult for the legislature
to constrain or resist unilateral action by the executive branch, which can give rise to the paradoxical result that
greater formal separation of legislative powers may lead to greater de facto concentration of lawmaking power in
the executive (Hammond and Knott 1996; Kagan 2001; Moe and Howell 1999). While this hypothesis may have
ramications similar to those generated by the model developed in this paper, the underlying mechanism is quite
dierent.
5normative implications of the analytic results.
I. The Model
A. Players, Payos, and Order of Play
There are two parties (or interest groups), which for convenience we will refer to as the \Left"
Party (L) and the \Right" Party (R). These parties will decide, through the policymaking process
elaborated below, whether to enact and implement a new law. Although at any given time the
polity might consider a large number of laws, we will focus on a single representative statute favored
by Party L. (One might imagine a parallel process playing out, more or less simultaneously, for
any number of statutes, some favored by Party L and others favored by Party R, but to simplify
things we will consider a single possible statute.) This statute, if enacted and implemented in the
form most preferred by Party L, would give Party L a net benet of B > 0, but would impose a
net cost of C > 0 on Party R, where B and C are common knowledge and exogenous.
For example, suppose the statute under consideration is a pollution control measure. In this
case, Party L's constituents are those who would benet from improved environmental quality
(such as conservationists, public health advocates, and rms that specialize in \clean" technologies)
while Party R represents constituencies, such as polluting rms and producers of \dirty" fuels, that
would bear most of the economic burdens associated with the proposed pollution controls. Or, we
might imagine that the law under consideration is an international treaty that would reduce tari
barriers, to the benet of Party L's supporters (such as consumers and export-oriented rms) and
to the detriment of Party R's supporters (import-competing rms). This latter example highlights
the fact that the labels \Left" and \Right" are merely for expositional convenience, and might not
correspond to conventional \liberal" and \conservative" ideologies or to organized political parties.4
Although B and C capture the welfare consequences of the statute if it is enacted in \pure" form
(that is, the form that gives proponents their highest feasible payo), it is possible to modify the
statute so that its distributional impact is more equitable. In particular, Party L may incorporate
4Indeed, instead of thinking of these two players as \parties," one can instead conceive of them simply as the
\proponents" and \opponents" of any given piece of legislation. Understood that way, it is clear that these \parties"
may in fact be coalitions of multiple factions|or, in multiparty parliamentary systems, of multiple parties|and
indeed this particular cleavage may cut across party lines.
6into the statutory proposal a \transfer," T  0, that increases the payo of the statute to Party
R by T but reduces the payo to Party L by T, where  > 0 captures the marginal cost to
Party L of making the compromises that mitigate the impact of the statute on Party R. For
example, suppose that the government is considering an environmental protection statute. The
most eective version of the statute would set emissions caps on pollution sources, but would allow
them to comply through whatever means are most ecient. This version of the statute, however,
would impose signicant costs on producers of dirty coal, because the cheapest way for most sources
to achieve compliance with the statute would be to switch to cleaner fuels. An alternative version
of the statute might require sources to use specic pollution control technologies instead of meeting
particular emissions targets. Doing so would mute the adverse impact of the statute on dirty coal
producers. This alternative statute would not be as good for proponents, as well as more costly|
mandating particular technologies is less eective in reducing pollution|but it is better than no
statute at all.5 Enacting the statute without concessions is equivalent to setting T = 0.
The two-period policymaking process proceeds as follows. At the start of the rst period, an
election determines control of the government's legislative institutions. For simplicity, and to focus
attention on the strategic behavior of politicians once in oce, the model treats the election as an
exogenous lottery: with probability p(1   ), where p 2 (0;1) and  2 [0;1], Party L has unied
control over the government, meaning that Party L can enact a new statute unilaterally; with
probability (1   p)(1   ), Party R has unied control. With probability , the government is
divided, which means that enacting new legislation requires the consent of both parties.6
The  parameter is crucial to the analysis, so it is worth unpacking a bit more. This parameter
seeks to capture, in reduced form, the degree of de facto \legislative fragmentation" or \separation
of powers." One can imagine  as an increasing function of, among other things, the number of
legislative veto gates created by the constitution and/or the subconstitutional rules of the legisla-
tive process, as will as the prevalence of super-majority rules or other measures that may give
minority factions blocking power. The basic idea is that a higher  indicates a higher probability
that opposing parties or factions will all wield enough legislative power that no one faction can
enact its preferred policies unless it is able to make sucient concessions to its opponents. Thus
5This stylized example is based on the history of the federal Clean Air Act (Ackerman and Hassler 1981).
6The \divided government" terminology, though expositionally useful, is potentially misleading. As noted earlier,
the relevant interest groups for a given statute might not correspond to political parties.
7a pure \unitary" system (perhaps approximated by a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy,
or a system in which a powerful chief executive eectively controls the lawmaking process) would
be characterized by  = 0. In such systems, whichever faction wins control of the single lawmaking
body can implement its agenda without having to worry about an opposition veto. The opposite
polar case, in which  = 1, might correspond (approximately) to a \consociational" system (Li-
jphart 1977), in which all major factions have an eective veto over new legislation. A system with
multiple independently elected legislative branches, or a legislature that operates under some form
of super-majority rule, would have some intermediate value of , with higher values of  imply-
ing greater fragmentation of legislative power. For example, consider a system with a bicameral
legislature, where each of two parties has a 50 percent chance of winning control of each chamber,
assuming for simplicity that those probabilities are statistically independent. In this case, we would
have p = 0:5 and  = 0:5: in each new lawmaking period, there is a 25 percent chance of unied
Left Party control, a 25 percent chance of unied Right Party control, and a 50 percent chance
that each party will control one chamber but not the other. That last possibility implies that
compromise is required to enact any new laws (or to repeal any existing ones). If there were three
veto players|say, a House, a Senate, and a President|and each party's odds of winning control of
any given branch remained 50-50 (and statistically independent), then we would have p = 0:5 and
 = 0:75, because in this setting the odds that a single faction will win control of all three branches
is only 1 in 4.7
After the rst-period election, Party L may propose the new statute (including in the proposal
a transfer, T), or may take no action. If Party L has unied control over the government, it may
enact the statute unilaterally; if not, it can enact the statute only if Party R consents.8 Enacting
the statute entails an additional cost to Party L of KE  0, which can be thought of as a reduced
7The assumption of statistical independence in these examples is unrealistic, but the modeling framework here
can accommodate correlations (both positive and negative) in the probabilities that any one faction controls dierent
lawmaking bodies. If the fortunes of a party's candidates for dierent oces tend to rise or fall together, then 
would tend to be lower, all else equal; if voters seem to prefer to \split their tickets" (Mebane 2000) then  would
tend to be higher.
8The assumption that Party L may propose the statute even if Party R has unied control may be unrealistic in
some systems, because the dominant party might not allow the opposition to introduce any proposals (even those
that would pass). The model could easily be altered to accommodate that sort of agenda control by assuming that if
Party R has unied control in the rst period, the game ends (or, alternatively, the game only starts when there is a
rst-period electoral result that would allow Party L to place a proposal on the agenda). While such a modication
would alter the analysis somewhat, the main qualitative results would hold. Moreover, because the selection of a
statute favored by Party L was an arbitrary expositional assumption, one could interpret the model as applying to
a dierent statute, favored by Party R, if Party R gets unied control in the rst period.
8form expression of the opportunity costs of the time, eort, and political capital required to develop
a statutory proposal, get it on the crowded legislative agenda, and secure its passage. A simple way
to micro-found this assumption might be to imagine that each party can allocate one unit of eort
per period either to legislating or to some alternative activity, such as retail constituency service,
with the latter providing a utility benet of KE.9 We restrict attention to cases in which B > KE,
as these are the only cases in which Party L would ever make a proposal.
The xed cost of legislative action is a crucial feature of the analysis. While it is presumably
uncontroversial that there is an opportunity cost (often a signicant opportunity cost) associated
with working on any given legislative initiative, modeling this cost as xed and exogenous comes
at some cost in terms of realism. In particular, one might plausibly argue that the enactment
cost ought to be a function of the substantive policy|though it is not clear a priori whether
the enactment cost ought to be increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic in the extremism of
the policy.10 While a richer model might incorporate variable enactment costs, as a rst cut it
seems reasonable to take them as xed, particularly since in many settings the main sources of
the enactment cost (e.g., time spent working on legislation rather than constituency service) are
plausibly exogenous to the content of the policy. Note also that the enactment cost is not a
function of whether the government is unied or divided; this may at rst seem unrealistic, but the
obstacles that divided government may create for legislation are captured by the possible need for
the transfer, T, in order to get the other party to go along.
At the beginning of the second period there is another election, which may result in a change
in control of the legislative branch(es) of the government. For simplicity, assume that the respec-
tive probabilities of Left Party unied government, Right Party unied government, and divided
government in the second period are the same as the probabilities of each of these congurations
in the rst period: p(1   ), (1   p)(1   ), and , respectively. Thus the probabilities of dierent
congurations of political control in the second period are independent of rst-period control and
9To economize on notation, the model assumes that the enactment cost KE is incurred only if the statute is
actually enacted. In the real world, a portion of these costs would be incurred whether or not the statute passes.
However, in equilibrium Party L proposes a statute only if it is certain to pass, which means that it is analytically
irrelevant whether the cost KE is incurred before or after enactment.
10Of course, to some extent variable costs associated with the level of policy extremism are already built into ,
the \shadow price" of policy moderation. If one thought, for example, that more moderate policies are less costly for
the dominant coalition to enact (and if one is willing to make the further heroic assumption that this relationship is
linear), then one can simply adjust  so that any given moderating transfer to R comes at a lower cost to Party L.
9of the policy choice. This admittedly unrealistic assumption greatly simplies the exposition of the
principal qualitative result that the model is meant to elucidate.11 The assumption may be most
substantively plausible for the mine-run of statutes (including many with signicant policy conse-
quences) that have a marginal impact on electoral outcomes relative to exogenous shocks (such as
the state of the economy).12 However, the assumption is most problematic when the policy choice
in question may have signicant electoral consequences for incumbent lawmakers, as will often be
the case for the most important, high-prole issues.13 Even in these cases, though, the simplifying
assumption that second-period election probabilities are independent of rst-period policy choice,
despite its lack of realism, is relatively benign for present purposes, given that this model is meant
to explore how the uncertainty of future electoral outcomes aects current decision-making. Al-
though the electoral consequences of the rst-period choice might make dierent levels of extremism
more or less attractive, and might likewise aect the strength of a party's interest in insulating its
measures from future repeal, so long as those eects are not so large that they swamp all other
considerations, then the qualitative results identied in the simplied model presented here would
continue to obtain, though perhaps in attenuated (or enhanced) form.14
If the rst-period government enacted the statute, the second-period government can choose
11Other contributions explore how separation-of-powers interacts with electoral incentives (Fox and Van Weelden
2010; Persson, Roland and Tabellini 1997; Stephenson and Nzelibe 2010; Vlaicu 2008); the analysis in this paper can
be seen as complementary to these eorts, though fully integrating their insights is a task for future research.
12This is not to say that real-world legislators will ever ignore completely the electoral consequences of their actions,
even when the electoral impact of any given decision may seem marginal (Arnold 1990; Kagan 2001). Rather, the
point is that for many issues, the short-term electoral consequences will be suciently small, relative to policy
considerations, that the assumption that reelection probabilities are exogenous does not entail too great a loss of
descriptive realism. This is particularly so when lawmakers deal with large numbers of issues, each of which has only
a small impact on their electoral prospects (Berry and Gersen 2008).
13It is worth noting, however, that the relationship between the \extremism" of the policy choice (as that term is
used here) and the parties' respective probabilities of reelection is not at all clear. A plausible intuitive hypothesis is
that more extreme redistributive policies should reduce the incumbents' probability of reelection, given the evidence
that most voters (at least in the United States) are centrist and prefer more moderate policies (Alesina and Rosenthal
1995; Mebane 2000; Mebane and Sekhon 2002). However, under some circumstances the electoral benets of \turning
out the base"|by enacting \extreme" policies that energize a party's core constituents|may outweigh the electoral
costs of reducing the party's appeal to centrist voters, despite the fact that the latter are more numerous (Fiorina
1999; Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro 2005; McGinnis and Rappaport 2006). It is therefore not clear whether the
the correlation between the extremism of the policy and Party L's electoral fortunes should be positive, negative, or
non-monotonic. It is partly for this reason that it seems reasonable, at least as a rst cut, to bracket this problem
and treat the election probabilities as exogenous, if only to establish a baseline.
14For example, if policy extremism decreases the chance that the incumbent will be reelected, then passing an
extreme statute becomes less attractive relative to passing a more moderate statute, both because oce-holding is
intrinsically valuable and because it is more likely that an extreme statute will be repealed due to a change in partisan
control. As the subsequent analysis will suggest, in this case increasing the degree of legislative fragmentation, by
reducing the risk of repeal, will make the extreme statute relatively more attractive, just as it does in the case where
electoral probabilities are exogenous.
10whether to repeal it. If Party R has sole control of the second-period government, it can repeal
the statute unilaterally; otherwise, Party R cannot repeal the statute without Party L's consent.
If Party R pushes through a repeal, it bears an additional cost of KR  0, which we can think of
as the opportunity cost of pressing for repeal (as opposed to working on other activities, such as
retail constituency service) as well as any political costs that advocating repeal might entail.15 We
restrict attention to cases where C > KR.
Both players then receive their payos. If no statute was enacted in the rst period, both parties
receive a status quo payo normalized to 0. If the statute was enacted in the rst period and
implemented (that is, not repealed) in the second period, then Party L's net payo is B T  KE,
while Party R's net payo is T   C. If the statute was enacted in the rst period but repealed in
the second period, then Party L's net payo is  KE, while Party R's net payo is  KR. These
assumptions imply that the statute does not have any policy eects until the conclusion of the second
period. That simplifying assumption may be substantively appropriate in some circumstances, as
when key statutory provisions do not take eect until several years after enactment (Gersen and
Posner 2007). It would also be appropriate, at least as a rst approximation, if the parties have long
time horizons (i.e., low discount rates). In most cases, though, policies have immediate eects on
lawmakers' welfare|both in terms of policy impact, and also in terms of the independent signaling
or \position taking" eect that supporting or opposing a policy may have on a lawmaker's reputation
with various constituencies (Mayhew 1974). That said, the main qualitative results of the analysis
below would continue to hold, albeit with some attenuation, in an alternative model where some of
the statutory benets and costs are realized in the rst period, as long as these rst-period eects
are not too large relative to second-period eects. Rather than including an additional term to
represent rst-period benets and costs (the qualitative eects of which would be obvious, and
which would not aect the comparative statics of interest), the model simply ignores rst-period
15As with KE, the model assumes Party R incurs cost KR only if the statute is actually repealed, but the results
would be identical if some of the cost were incurred when repeal is proposed, since in equilibrium Party R only
proposes repeal when it anticipates success. Also as with KE, the model assumes KR is constant and independent of
the extremism of the statute, an assumption that, while admittedly unrealistic, greatly simplies the analysis.
In addition, it is worth observing that the model does not assume KE = KR. It is easy to imagine a variety of
reasons why these costs may dier. For example, it is plausible that it is much more dicult, in terms of time and
eort, to design a new policy program than to eliminate one that already exists|a bill enacting a new program may
be thousands of pages, while a bill repealing that program may be a few paragraphs. This would imply KR < KE.
On the other hand, the enactment of a statute may create vested interests that signicantly raise the political costs
of repeal (Coate and Morris 1999; Pierson 2001). This could imply KR > KE. The model can accommodate either
possibility.
11eects.16 The reader should keep in mind, however, that very large rst-period eects would tend
to undermine the principal reason why separation of powers might (counter-intuitively) sometimes
induce moderation or inaction. Thus this model should be understood as applying principally
to those issues for which long-term eects are important relative to short-term eects. Major
regulatory initiatives would seem to have that property in many cases, though other policies may
not.17
In sum, the game is as follows:
Step 0: The rst election is held. With probability p(1   ), Party L has sole control over the
government; with probability (1   p)(1   ), Party R has sole control; and with probability
, the government is divided.
Step 1: Party L can choose either to propose a statute or to do nothing. If Party L chooses to do
nothing, the game proceeds immediately to Step 6. If Party L chooses to propose a statute,
Party L also chooses a transfer, T.
Step 2: If Party L has sole control, the statute proposed at Step 1 is automatically enacted. Otherwise,
Party R chooses whether to accept the proposal. If Party R rejects the proposal, the status
quo remains in eect, and the game proceeds immediately to Step 6. If Party R accepts the
proposal, the statute is enacted, and Party L incurs an enactment cost of KE.
Step 3: There is a second election. With probability p(1   ), this election gives Party L unied
control of the government; with probability (1  p)(1 ), the election gives Party R unied
control; and with probability , the government is divided.
Step 4: Party R decides whether to propose repeal of the statute. If Party R chooses not to do so,
the statute is implemented and the game proceeds immediately to Step 6.
16Alternatively, it is possible to imagine some rst-period eects as already implicitly incorporated into the model's
existing parameters, so long as those eects are not too large. For example, for Party L, one can think of the
enactment cost KE not simply as the opportunity costs of enactment, but as the opportunity costs of enactment
minus whatever rst-period benets Party L would receive from enacting the statute. The model's assumption that
KE  0 implies that those rst-period benets are not large enough for Party L ever to enact a statute that has only
rst-period benets. For Party R, rst-period eects cannot be incorporated into existing model parameters quite so
straightforwardly, but it is clear that the existence of rst-period costs would imply only that Party R would demand
a larger minimum transfer T to consent to the enactment of Party L's proposed statute, and would not otherwise
aect Party R's behavior.
17Note also that the model applies only to those policy initiatives that, once enacted, remain in force. Policies that
must be re-approved on a regular basis, such as discretionary spending allocations or statutes with sunset clauses,
would have only rst-period eects, and so the analysis here would not apply.
12Step 5: If Party R has unied control over the government, it chooses whether to repeal the statute.
Otherwise, Party R may propose repeal but the proposal must be approved by Party L. If
approval is not granted, the statute remains in eect. Repealing the statute costs Party R
an additional KR.
Step 6: Both players receive their policy payos. If no statute was ever enacted, or if a statute was
enacted but subsequently repealed, both players receive a status quo policy payo of 0. If the
statute is enacted and retained, Party L receives a policy payo of B   T, while Party R
receives a policy payo of T   C. (These policy payos do not include any legislation costs,
KE and KR, that the parties may have also incurred.)
B. Equilibrium
This is a sequential nite-period game with perfect information, so one can use backward induction
to identify the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for dierent parameter values.
In the second period, if Party L has sole control over the government (which occurs with
probability p(1 )), or if the government is divided (which occurs with probability ), the statute
will be retained and implemented.18 Retention of the statute gives Parties L and R second-period
payos of B T and T  C, respectively. However, if Party R has sole control of the second-period
government (which occurs with probability (1   p)(1   )), then Party R can unilaterally repeal
the statute. If Party R chooses to do so, then its second-period payo is  KR, while Party L's
second-period payo is 0. If Party R leaves the statute in place, then its second-period payo is
T  C, while Party L's second-period payo is B T. This implies that if Party R has sole control
of the second-period government, it will repeal the statute if but only if T < C   KR. Thus the
minimum transfer required to induce Party R to leave the statute in place is C   KR.19
18This claim assumes that B  T. This is always true in equilibrium, since a statute with B < T would give
Party L a negative policy payo, and Party L would never have an incentive to adopt such a statute.
The assertion that the statute would always be retained if Party L can block second-period repeal also assumes
that Party R cannot oer Party L a side payment. If Party R could oer a (take-it-or-leave-it) side payment in
exchange for consent to a repeal, this would (weakly) improve Party R's expected payo, but it would not aect
Party L's second-period payo, because the side payment would be just enough to oset Party L's expected gain
from the statute. Thus Party L's rst-period incentives would be unaected. There are other possibilities, however.
For example, if Party L could dictate the terms of the side payment, there could be equilibria in which Party L
enacts a statute with the purpose of extracting side payments from Party R in exchange for repeal. These and other
possibilities are left for future research.
19The analysis makes the tie-breaking assumption that if Party R is indierent between repealing and retaining
the statute, it will not propose repeal.
13Now consider the rst period. Consider rst the case in which Party L has unied control over
the rst-period government, and so can enact a new statute unilaterally. In this case, Party L has
three (relevant) choices. First, Party L could take no action, guaranteeing itself a status quo payo
of 0. Second, Party L could enact the statute and set T = 0. We will refer to this version of the
statute as an \extreme" statute, in that it confers the largest feasible benet (B) on Party L and
the largest possible cost (C) on Party R. An extreme statute, however, will be repealed if Party R
takes over in the second period, because of the assumption that C > KR. Thus Party L's expected
net payo from enacting an extreme statute is [1   (1   p)(1   )]B   KE. Third, Party L could
enact the statute but set T = C  KR. We will refer to this version of the statute as a \moderate"
statute. A moderate statute will always be retained in the second period, even under unied Right
Party government, because even though such a statute imposes net costs on Party R, these costs
are no larger than the costs of repeal. Therefore, enacting a moderate statute gives Party L a
net utility of B   (C   KR)   KE. Note that Party L never has an incentive to enact a statute
with T 2 (0;C   KR), as doing so sacrices policy benets without foreclosing the possibility of
repeal. Likewise, when Party L has unied control over the government, it never has an incentive
to enact a statute with T > C   KR, as this would entail making more concessions than necessary
to guarantee the implementation of the statute. In the unied Left Party government case, then,
we can focus on Party L's choice among three options: (1) the status quo, (2) the extreme statute
(T = 0), and (3) the moderate statute (T = C   KR).
It will be helpful, in characterizing Party L's equilibrium choice among these three options, to
dene  = maxf1  B KE
(1 p)B;1 
(C KR)
(1 p)B g. Algebraic manipulation of the expected utility expressions
in the preceding paragraph reveals reveals that if   , Party L will adopt an extreme statute
under unied rst-period government. If  <  and B   KE  (C   KR), Party L will enact the
moderate statute, while if  <  and B   KE < (C   KR), Party L will take no action.20 The
intuition for the signicance of  is that if Party L has unied control over the government in the
rst period, only the threat of repeal could deter Party L from enacting an extreme statute. This
threat is weaker if divided government in the second period is more likely, because under divided
government Party L can block any attempted repeal. If  < , the threat of repeal is sucient to
20The analysis makes the tie-breaking assumptions that: (1) if Party L is indierent between a moderate statute
and an extreme statute, it will choose the extreme statute; and (2) if Party L is indierent between enacting a new
statute and the status quo, it will choose to enact the statute.
14deter Party L from enacting an extreme statute. The question then becomes whether Party L will
enact a moderate statute or nothing at all. This choice depends simply on whether Party L's net
benet from a moderate statute (B   (C   KR)   KE) is positive or negative.21
Now consider the case in which the rst-period government is either divided or under Party R's
control. In this case, Party R can guarantee itself a status quo payo of 0 by vetoing Party L's
legislative proposal. Therefore, to convince Party R to go along with enactment of the new statute,
Party L must oer a transfer of at least T = C.22 We will refer to a statute containing a transfer of
T = C as a \consensus" statute, because this proposal is enacted with the support of both parties
(even though the net benet is strictly positive only for Party L). A consensus statute is always
retained in the second period, even if Party R has sole second-period control, because it is never
worthwhile for Party R to incur the costs of repeal (KR) in order to obtain a status quo payo (0)
that is equal to Party R's net payo under the consensus statute (T  C = 0). Thus, under divided
rst-period government, Party L has two (meaningful) choices: (1) it can secure enactment of a
consensus statute (T = C) for a net payo of B   C   KE, or (2) it can take no action, for a
status quo payo of 0. Party L prefers the former if but only if B   KE  C.23
II. Institutional Comparisons
The primary questions of interest concern how the probability of divided government () aects
two outcome variables: (1) the expected frequency of legislative action, and (2) the expected
21The assumptions that B > KE and C > KR guarantee that  < 1. However, some feasible parameter values
would generate   0, which would imply that Party L would always adopt an extreme statute when possible. This
is the case if the maximum statutory benet to Party L (B) is suciently large relative to the enactment cost (KE)
but suciently small relative to the cost of the minimum transfer necessary to insulate the statute from reversal
((C   KR)). More precisely, if B 2 [
KE
p ;
(C KR)
1 p ], then the probability of divided government does not aect
how a rst-period unied government would behave. This is the case implicitly assumed by the standard analysis
of separation of powers. The analysis in this paper indicates that these results may not hold if enactment costs
are suciently large (KE > pB), or if the costs of the transfers needed to insulate the statute are suciently small
((C  KR) < (1 p)B). If either of those conditions hold, then  2 (0;1), which means that for some feasible values
of  a rst-period unied government would enact an extreme statute, but for other feasible values of  it would not.
22In this model Party L can make a take-it-or-leave-it oer to Party R. There are, of course, many other ways
that the potential surplus of the statute might be divided, but the simple structure employed here is a reasonable
and analytically simple way to develop the main qualitative results, one that is consistent with canonical models of
legislative bargaining (Baron and Ferejohn 1989). More substantively, one might suppose that the dierent parties
have dierent legislative priorities; Party R might thus be willing to concede agenda-setting power on this statute to
Party L because Party R is assuming the agenda-setting role on other proposals.
23Under divided government, Party L has no incentive to propose a statute with T 6= C. Any proposed statute
with T < C would not be enacted, while any proposed statute with T > C would entail more concessions than are
necessary to secure enactment.
15extremism or moderation of government policy. As noted in the introduction, a standard (though
not universal) hypothesis is that institutions that induce a greater fragmentation of legislative
power|for example, bicameralism, an executive veto, super-majority rules, or a strong committee
system|will, all else equal, tend to reduce the frequency of legislation overall and to induce greater
moderation of government policy (that is, to induce compromises that result in statutes that are
somewhat better for those parties initially in opposition, and somewhat less good for proponents).
These hypotheses ow from the natural and intuitive observation that a separation of powers makes
it more dicult to enact a new statute because it is more likely that the statute's opponents will
control at least one of the \veto gates" in the legislative process, which in turn will force the statute's
proponents either to make signicant concessions or to abandon the legislative eort altogether.
This observation is not wrong, but it is critically incomplete. The model developed in Part I
indicates that changes in  may have two eects, which can cut in opposite directions. First, as the
conventional argument sketched above suggests, an increase in  increases the probability that the
rst-period government will be divided rather than unied. And, indeed, under divided government
the proponents of a new statute cannot pass that statute unless they are willing to make signicant
concessions to the statute's opponents|concessions that make the opponents at least as well o
under the new statute as they would have been under the status quo. However, an increase in
 may have a second eect as well. If  2 (0;1), then it is possible that an institutional change
might increase  from a value below  to a value above . If this occurs, then Party L's rst-period
equilibrium strategy will change. In particular, when  < , a unied Left Party government would
either adopt a moderate statute or retain the status quo, but if  increases to a value above , Party
L would take advantage of unied rst-period government to enact an extreme statute instead.24
Most discussions of separation-of-powers institutions tend to neglect this second eect.25
24If   0, this second eect would not arise, because it would be the case that    for all permissible values of
. In that case, the conventional account of separation-of-powers institutions would be unproblematic. The analysis
in the main text focuses on the more interesting case in which  2 (0;1).
25As noted earlier, the most prominent exceptions to this generalization about the existing literature are Ackerman
(2000) and de Figueiredo (2002). While the analysis here owes an obvious intellectual debt to these contributions, it
also diers in several ways.
With respect to de Figueiredo (2002), although the qualitative result that separation of powers can increase
moderation is similar, the mechanism is quite dierent, in that de Figueiredo considers an innite-horizon game in
which cooperation is sustained via punishment strategies. The distinct mechanisms highlighted by this paper and by
de Figueiredo (2002) are not mutually exclusive; rather, they can be seen as complementary.
The mechanism suggested by Ackerman (2000) appears somewhat closer to the mechanism driving the analysis in
this paper. There are, however, two important dierences (in addition to the fact that Ackerman does not formalize
his insight). First, Ackerman does not attempt to assess the eect of separation of powers on the expected stability or
16To pursue this idea further, let us compare a \unitary" system in which  = 0 <  to a
\separation-of-powers" (SOP) system in which  =    (that is, a SOP system in which the
probability of divided government is high enough to aect Party L's equilibrium choice under
rst-period unied government).26 We are interested in comparing these institutional regimes
with respect to: (1) the probability that new legislation is enacted in the rst period, as well
as the probability that new legislation is both enacted and retained; and (2) the \moderation" or
\extremism" of the legislative outcome. This latter variable is dened simply as the expected cost of
the legislative policy outcome to Party R. The higher this cost, the more \extreme" is the legislative
outcome.27 Although there are other ways one might dene policy moderation/extremism, this
denition seems most in keeping with prominent arguments about the eect of separation of powers,
namely, that it will protect the interests of parties that stand to lose from new legislation, either
by blocking the legislation or by inducing the legislation's proponents to oer more concessions.
The analysis is complicated by the fact that the players' equilibrium strategies depend not only
on , but on the other parameters as well. We will therefore consider separately two cases. In the
moderation of government policy. Indeed, Ackerman's analysis seems to imply that on average, U.S.-style separation
of powers will produce greater policy stability (or, in his terms, \impasse"), even though on rare occasions of unied
government there will be urries of activity. As the analysis below shows, however, under plausible conditions even
the expected stability and moderation of government policy can decrease as the fragmentation of legislative power
increases. Second, Ackerman focuses primarily on features of legislation other than its distributional eects|in
particular: (1) whether the legislation is pragmatic or symbolic, and (2) whether the legislation is narrowly legalistic
or whether it delegates more open-ended authority to those charged with implementation. Ackerman hypothesizes
that unitary Westminster-style systems tend to produce practical programs that provide immediate and tangible
benets to voters, while U.S.-style separation of powers encourages parties that nd themselves in the rare position
of full control to enact legislation that is both heavily symbolic (because it is easier to deliver symbolic as opposed
to concrete results before the next election) and extremely legalistic (because detailed legal requirements are harder
to overturn or redirect than are more open-ended programs administered by the bureaucracy). (This latter claim is
similar to the \intentional bureaucratic ineciency" argument developed most prominently by Moe (1989, 1990), and
critiqued by de Figueiredo (2002).) While the analysis presented here is compatible with these hypotheses, it focuses
instead on expected distributional consequences. Indeed, perhaps contra Ackerman, the model developed here implies
that under unied government the incumbents' incentives are to enact statutes with signicant substantive eects,
rather than those that are mostly symbolic. Also, the analysis here suggests an important caveat to Ackerman's
claim that governments in unitary systems will tend to produce incremental, practical legislation: if the enactment
costs of such legislation are suciently high relative to the benets (to the incumbent party), the result may be to
discourage such legislation altogether.
26Increasing  from 0 to any value below  increases the probability of divided government without aecting
equilibrium behavior under either unied or divided government. Likewise, increasing  from  to any value above
 increases the probability of divided government without changing equilibrium behavior.
27This denition implies that the most moderate possible equilibrium outcome is one that gives Party R its status
quo payo (0). In principle, a statute that provided equal benets to both parties|that is, a statute with T =
B+C
1+ ,
such that each party receives a policy payo of B   T = T   C|would be maximally moderate, but such statutes
are never enacted in equilibrium (except in the special case where T = C =
B
 , in which case both parties get a policy
payo of 0). Also, when interpreting the qualitative discussion of the main results, it is important to keep in mind
that \moderation" here does not mean moderation in some objective or absolute sense; rather, it means moderation
in the degree of change from the status quo.
17rst case, B  KE < (C  KR). This condition implies that in a unitary system ( = 0), a united
Left Party government would not enact the statute in the rst period, even though (by assumption)
the policy benets of the statute (B) exceed the opportunity costs of enactment (KE). The reason
is that even if Party L has sole control of the rst-period government, it recognizes that Party R
might well assume control in the second period, and if that occurs then an extreme statute would
be repealed. This threat of repeal is signicant enough to deter Party L from enacting an extreme
statute, as the probability-discounted benet of enacting the extreme statute (pB) is smaller than
the opportunity cost of enactment (KE).28 Furthermore, the condition that B  KE < (C  KR)
implies that the costs to Party L of the concessions necessary to insulate the statute against repeal
are too high to make enactment of a moderate statute worthwhile.
This case is most likely to obtain (that is, the condition that B KE < (C KR) is most likely
to hold) when the benets of the statute to its proponents are small relative to the enactment cost
(B   KE low), when the costs of the statute to its opponents are large relative to the repeal cost
(C  KR high), and when softening the impact of the statute on the opposition requires dissipating
a large proportion of the benets to supporters ( high). So, speaking somewhat loosely, we might
say that the statutes that fall into this category are those that transfer relatively small net benets
to proponents at a relatively high net cost to opponents, and cannot easily be modied to mitigate
their redistributive eects. Precisely for these reasons, such statutes would not be enacted under
a unitary system: they are too vulnerable to repeal to be worthwhile even to the party that would
benet from them.
Now consider what happens when we move from a unitary system ( = 0), to a SOP system
in which  =   .29 Under this system, if the rst-period government is divided (or if Party
R has sole control), then, as before, no statute is enacted. However, if Party L has unied control
over the rst-period government, it will enact an extreme statute. The reason is that the increase
in the probability of second-period divided government reduces the likelihood of repeal, and this
makes the enactment of an extreme statute suciently more attractive to Party L that it would
be willing to bear the opportunity cost of enactment.
Thus in this case the introduction of SOP institutions (such as bicameralism) has the coun-
28The assumptions that  2 (0;1) and that B   KE < (C   KR) together imply that pB < KE.
29The condition that B   KE < (C   KR) implies that  = 1  
B KE
(1 p)B.
18terintuitive eect of increasing the probability that the rst-period government will enact the
statute|this probability increases from 0 to p(1 ). Of course, there is a (1 p)(1 ) proba-
bility that this (extreme) statute will be repealed. Therefore, the shift from the unitary system to
the SOP system increases the probability of a new law actually taking eect by a somewhat smaller
amount|from 0 to p(1   )[1   (1   p)(1   )]. Nonetheless, in this case greater legislative
fragmentation increases rather than decreases the probability of policy change.30
What about the eect of a shift from a unitary system ( = 0) to a SOP system ( =   )
on the expected extremism of the legislative outcome? It follows immediately from the above
discussion that, in the case where B   KE < (C   KR), increasing  from 0 to  makes the
expected legislative outcome more extreme (that is, more adverse to Party R's interests). Under
the unitary regime, Party L never enacts the statute, which gives Party R a status quo payo of 0
(the most moderate possible equilibrium outcome). However, under the SOP regime Party L will
enact an extreme statute if it secures unied control of the government; this imposes a policy cost of
C on Party R, unless Party R manages to take sole control of the government in the second period
and unilaterally repeals the statute. Thus under SOP the expected extremism of the legislative
outcome (that is, the expected policy cost to Party R) is p(1   )[1   (1   p)(1   )]C  0.
The preceding case is perhaps the starkest illustration of the model's central insight: under some
circumstances, greater fragmentation of legislative powers can increase the frequency of legislation,
leading to less moderate policy outcomes. The intuition, again, is that although an increase in 
reduces the probability of unied government, an increase in  from a value less than  to a value
greater than  will alter Party L's incentives such that a unied Left Party government in the rst
period will enact an extreme statute rather than retaining the status quo.
There is, however, a second case to consider. Suppose that B   KE > (C   KR).31 In this
case, the net benets of the statute to Party L are large relative to the cost of modifying the statute
to insulate it against future repeal. Loosely speaking, such statutes are those that produce large
benets to proponents at relatively modest cost to opponents (B  KE large, C small), those with
signicant repeal costs (KR large), and/or those for which the compromises needed to mitigate the
statute's adverse impact on opponents are not very costly to the statute's proponents ( small).
30Note, however, that increasing  from 0 up to any value just short of  will leave the probability of new legislation
unchanged at 0, while further increases in  above  will reduce the probability that new legislation is enacted.
31This condition, coupled with the restriction to cases in which  2 (0;1), implies  = 1  
(C KR)
(1 p)B .
19For statutes in this category, Party L would rather make the necessary concessions to insulate the
statute against repeal than leave the status quo in place. In this case, then, a unitary system
( = 0) produces legislative action: if Party L controls the legislature, it will enact a moderate
statute, which will be retained in the second period no matter which party is in power; if Party R
has the power to block the statute in the rst period, then Party L will either take no action (if
B   KE  C) or propose a consensus statute (if B   KE > C), which Party R would accept.
Under a SOP system in which  =   , however, the outcome may be quite dierent. Under
such a system, if Party L has unied rst-period control, it will enact an extreme statute rather
than a moderate statute. The intuition, as before, is that if the probability of (future) divided
government is high enough, then if Party L enjoys unied government in the rst period, it would
be willing to risk enacting an extreme statute given the low probability of repeal. Repeal will
nonetheless occur if Party R secures unied control of the government in the second period. If
Party R can block legislation in the rst period, then Party L will either take no action or propose
a consensus statute (depending on whether B KE is less than or greater than C); either of these
outcomes gives Party R a net payo of 0.
In this case, then, a move from a unitary regime ( = 0) to a SOP regime ( =   ) can
reduce the frequency of legislative enactments, as the conventional account of legislative fragmen-
tation predicts, but only if rst-period divided government would produce inaction rather than a
consensus statute (that is, only if B   KE  C). More precisely, such a shift would reduce the
probability that legislation is enacted from p to p(1   ), and would reduce the probability that
new legislation is both enacted and retained from p to p(1   )[1   (1   p)(1   )]. However,
if divided government would produce a consensus statute (that is, if B   KE > C), then a shift
from a unitary system ( = 0) to a SOP system ( =   ) will not reduce the probability that
the government enacts a new statute in the rst period, though it will reduce the total amount of
legislation that is actually implemented. (The probability of rst-period enactment in both cases
is 1, but the probability of second-period implementation drops from 1 to 1   p(1   p)(1   )2.)
What about the expected extremism of the policy outcome? Under the unitary regime, the
expected cost of the legislative outcome to Party R is pKR (because with probability p Party
L will unilaterally enact a moderate statute that gives Party R a net payo of  KR). Under
the SOP regime, the expected cost of the legislative outcome to Party R (excluding the costs of
20pushing through a repeal) is p(1 )[1 (1 p)(1 )]C (the probability that Party L both has
unied control in the rst period and has the ability to block repeal in the second period, times
the cost to Party R of the extreme statute). Thus the expected extremism of the policy outcome
is greater under the unitary system ( = 0) than under the SOP system ( =   ) if but only
if (p   1)()2 + (1   2p) + (p   KR
C ) > 0.32 Otherwise, the expected extremism of the policy
outcome is actually higher under the SOP system, contrary to the conventional wisdom. Formally,
if B   KE > (C   KR), expected policy extremism is higher with SOP ( =   ) than with a
unitary system ( = 0) if  2 [minf1 
(C KR)
(1 p)B ; 1
1 p(1
2 p 
q
1
4   KR
2C )g; 1
1 p(1
2 p+
q
1
4   KR
2C )).33
This interval is somewhat dicult to interpret, but it actually reects a reasonably straight-
forward intuition. In order for policy extremism to be greater under SOP than under a unitary
system, three things must be true about the probability of divided government under SOP ().
First,  must be large enough that Party L would prefer to enact an extreme statute rather
than a moderate statute (   = 1  
(C KR)
(1 p)B ). Second,  must be large enough that ex-
pected extremism is higher if Party L enacts a moderate statute rather than an extreme statute
(  1
1 p(1
2   p  
q
1
4   KR
2C )). Third,  must be small enough that the expected costs of such
extremism to Party R more than oset the decrease in the frequency with which Party L has uni-
ed rst-period control ( < 1
1 p(1
2   p +
q
1
4   KR
2C )). One can simplify this considerably with
the admittedly restrictive assumption that p = 0:5 (such that each party has an equal chance of
securing unied government control). In that case, a shift from  = 0 to  =  increases expected
extremism if but only if  2 (1  
2(C KR)
B ;
q
1   2KR
C ).
To illustrate how greater separation of powers can increase expected policy extremism, consider
a numerical example in which p = 0:5, B = 4, KE = 2, C = 2, KR = 0:5, and  = 1. These values
satisfy the condition that B KE > (C  KR) (because 2 > 1:5). So, in a unitary system ( = 0),
if Party L has unied control of the rst-period government (which occurs with probability 0:5),
it will enact a moderate statute (T = 1:5), and this statute will always be retained in the second
32The left-hand side of this inequality is increasing in 
 for all 
 <
2p 1
2(1 p), and decreasing in 
 for all 
 >
2p 1
2(1 p).
So, if p  0:5, this expression is always decreasing in 
, meaning that so long as 
  , greater fragmentation of
legislative power always reduces expected policy extremism. However, if p < 0:5, there are values of 
 such that
even if 
  , increasing the fragmentation of powers would increase the expected extremism of the policy outcome.
The reason is that if p is small, increasing the probability of divided government has a greater (negative) marginal
eect on the probability that an extreme statute is repealed than on the probability that such a statute is enacted.
33If 2KR > C, then there is no real solution to the expression for the upper bound of this interval (or for the
second candidate for the lower bound); in that case, expected extremism is always maximized when  = 0, as the
conventional wisdom would predict.
21period. If Party R can block legislation in the rst period, then no statute will be enacted. Thus
under a unitary regime Party R's expected policy payo is (0:5)(1:5 2) =  0:25. Now consider a
SOP system in which  = 0:5 (that is, there is a 50 percent chance of divided government in each
period).34 The numerical values above imply that  = 0:25. Because this value is smaller than
0:5, it follows that if Party L has unied control in the rst period (which occurs with probability
0:25), it will enact an extreme statute (T = 0), which will be retained in the second period with
probability 0:75. If Party L does not have sole rst-period control, no statute will be enacted. The
expected policy payo to Party R under the SOP regime is therefore (0:25)(0:75)( 2) =  0:375.
In this example, the expected extremism of the policy outcome (that is, the expected policy cost
to Party R) is greater with separation of powers than it is in a unitary system (0:375 > 0:25).
The central result of the analysis can also be illustrated graphically, as in Figure 1. The case
depicted in this gure uses the same values for B, C, KE, KR, and  as in the numerical example
above. The x-axis is the degree of legislative fragmentation, . The y-axis is the expected payo
to Party R, which can be thought of as a measure of expected policy moderation (lower values in
the gure correspond to more extreme expected policy outcomes). Note that this value increases
as  increases from 0 to , and as  increases from  to 1. However, there is a discontinuous jump
downward at  = , because at this point Party L switches its rst-period approach (in those cases
where it has full control) from proposing a moderate policy to proposing an extreme policy.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
In sum, the preceding analysis shows that an increase in the fragmentation of legislative power
can have (at least) two cross-cutting eects on policy stability and moderation. First, separation
of powers increases the probability of divided government, which decreases the probability that
the proponents of a statute will be able to enact it without signicant concessions to opponents.
All else equal, this eect implies that greater fragmentation of legislative power will reduce the
frequency of legislation (that is, fragmentation increases stability) and/or will result in legislative
outcomes that are less harmful to opposition interests (that is, fragmentation increases moderation).
Second, precisely because separation of powers increases the probability of divided government, it
also reduces the implicit threat that an extreme statute, if enacted, will be repealed at a later date.
34The parameter values p = 0:5 and 
 = 0:5 would correspond to a bicameral system in which each party has a
50-50 chance of winning control of each branch, with election results independent across branches and across time.
22This means that under a separation-of-powers system, if one party manages to secure unied control
over all legislative institutions, that party is more likely to enact extreme statutes|implying less
stability and/or less moderation than one would have observed under a unitary system.
These cross-cutting eects mean that the fragmentation of legislative power may not have a
monotonic eect on either the expected stability or the expected moderation of government policy.
Furthermore, the second of these two eects|the one that implies a negative correlation between
separation of powers and the moderation or stability of policy outcomes|is most pronounced
for (loosely speaking) \intermediate" levels of separation of powers. A consociational system, or
something close to it, is indeed likely to produce either legislative inertia or broad consensus statutes.
But lesser degrees of legislative fragmentation|in which there is a substantial probability of divided
government but also a substantial probability of unied government|may relax the constraint
induced by the implicit threat of repeal without a fully osetting reduction in the probability that
one party or faction will have the opportunity to implement its preferred legislative initiatives.
III. Discussion
The preceding analysis has very dierent empirical implications than the more familiar hypothesis
that greater separation of legislative powers tends (monotonically) to produce greater stability and
policy moderation. As discussed above, the model developed here predicts that|at least for certain
kinds of statutes|unitary systems (with a very low level of legislative fragmentation) and conso-
ciational systems (or, more generally, systems with a very high level of legislative fragmentation)
should exhibit more stability and/or compromise, while systems with an intermediate degree of leg-
islative fragmentation should exhibit a dierent pattern, with periods of inactivity punctuated by
occasional bursts of relatively extreme statutory redistribution, which then persist for substantial
periods of time before eventual repeal or modication.
Moreover, the model oers some guidance as to the types of statutes for which this non-
monotonic relationship between legislative fragmentation and policy stability/moderation is more
likely. In particular, in order for this non-monotonicity result to hold, the implicit threat of re-
peal must be substantial enough that it would aect the behavior of a party or interest group
that manages to secure temporary control of the legislative branch(es). If there is no signicant
23repeal threat|if, for example, the cost of repeal is very high, or if the party in power and its
principal supporters care overwhelmingly about short-term rather than long-term policy eects|
then each party would always push through the most extreme proposal it can enact. In that case,
the only constraint on policy extremism would be at the enactment stage, and the conventional
wisdom|that separation of legislative power encourages stability and moderation|would hold.
The non-monotonicity highlighted by this paper is most likely for statutes which provide substan-
tial long-term benets to supporters (making insulation against repeal a priority for proponents)
but impose substantial costs on opponents (making the threat of repeal credible). In other words,
the kinds of statutes for which the analysis in this paper is most likely to apply are those with the
greatest redistributive potential|and such statutes, at least on some accounts, are precisely the
ones that should be of greatest concern from the perspective of an institutional designer.
Of course, whether the implicit threat of repeal in fact aects legislative behavior in the way
the model suggests is an empirical question, and this empirical question is very dicult to answer
given limitations of the existing data. Nonetheless, there is some suggestive evidence that dynamics
of the sort predicted by the model are plausible. First, at least in the U.S. federal system, despite
the common misperception that government programs are \immortal," repeals or major revisions
of the statutes that create such programs (including redistributive programs) are in fact fairly
common (Berry, Burden and Howell 2010; Corder 2004; Maltzman and Shipan 2008; Ragusa 2010).
This implies that rational lawmakers and interest groups would take the threat of repeal seriously.
Moreover, consistent with the model's predictions (and unsurprisingly) repeals are more likely
following a change in the partisan control of the government (Berry, Burden and Howell 2010),
but|also consistent with the model's predictions|repeals are less likely during periods of divided
government (Ragusa 2010).35
35As noted above, partisan unity or division may not correlate perfectly with the sort of unity or division that is
relevant here, but it its likely somewhat correlated.
Any discussion of relative legislative productivity under unied versus divided government in the U.S. must of
course acknowledge the seminal work of Mayhew (1991), who found that the federal government produces as many
major laws in periods of divided government as it does in periods of unied government (see also Mayhew (2005)).
A strong interpretation of Mayhew's (much debated) nding|that divided government has no eect on legislative
output|would pose a challenge to the empirical validity of both the model presented in this paper and the more
conventional view that separation of powers promotes stability. However, it is possible that the consistency in the
quantity of legislative output masks signicant variation in the content of that output. In particular, the model
presented here predicts that rst-period divided government would block the enactment of certain statutes, but in
other cases rst-period divided government would produce \consensus" statutes. If the total number of potential
proposals that would produce a consensus statute is larger than the legislative \budget constraint" in each period, then
divided government might produce a similar number of major laws to what one observes under unied government,
24The available evidence is somewhat more mixed on whether|as the model predicts|legislation
passed by unied government is more extreme, and thus more vulnerable to repeal. Unfortunately,
the lack of good objective measures makes it dicult to compare levels of \extremism" or \moder-
ation." Nonetheless, there is some suggestive evidence from the U.S. federal system that is broadly
consistent with the model's predictions, in that legislation passed by unied governments is more
likely (relative to legislation passed under divided government) to pass on party-line votes (Thorson
1998) and to address \major" issues (Binder 1999). Party-line votes on signicant issues suggest,
though of course do not establish, more extreme redistribution. As for whether legislation adopted
by unied governments is more vulnerable to repeal, although some preliminary empirical research
on this point suggested the opposite (Maltzman and Shipan 2008), more recent research has found
that legislation enacted under divided government is indeed more durable than legislation enacted
under unied government (Ragusa 2010), which again is broadly consistent with the model's pre-
dictions (though certainly not conclusive).
The available evidence on whether systems with greater fragmentation of legislative power ex-
hibit greater stability and/or policy moderation is mixed. While some cross-country research nds
that systems with more legislative veto players produce fewer new laws (Henisz 2004; Tsebelis 2002),
other research looking at within-jurisdiction variation in systems that altered their legislative pro-
cess nds no signicant eect (Rogers 2003). The former set of ndings may appear more consistent
with the conventional wisdom than with the predictions of the model presented in this paper. How-
ever, in addition to generic concerns about this sort of empirical analysis (such as the endogeneity
of institutional choices and the diculty of developing measures of legislative fragmentation that
are consistent and comparable across systems), the relevant cross-country research typically uses
linear regression models that would obscure non-monotonic eects of the sort predicted by the
theoretical analysis developed in this paper. Furthermore, the existing literature typically focuses
on the more easily measured quantity of legislative output (that is, policy stability), rather than
its distributive implications (that is, moderation).
Thus while a rigorous investigation of the model's empirical predictions is beyond the scope
of this paper, much (though admittedly not all) of the available quantitative evidence is broadly
but these laws would be much dierent (with smaller redistributive eects). That interpretation is consistent with at
least some of the research sparked by Mayhew's pioneering work (Coleman 1999; Howell et al. 2000; Thorson 1998).
25consistent with the model's principal assumptions and predictions. None of this is dispositive, and
this paper makes no claim that the non-monotonicity identied as a possibility by the theoretical
analysis is in fact empirically signicant. The more modest claim is that nothing in the existing
empirical literature provides a sucient reason to reject this possibility out of hand, and the model's
predictions ought to be explicitly compared to the predictions of the more conventional hypotheses
about the separation of powers, to the extent that the data allow such comparisons.
If it turns out that the main theoretical predictions of the model are accurate|if the separation
of legislative power indeed has a non-monotonic eect on legislative stability and moderation, such
that greater legislative fragmentation may sometimes lead to more, and more extreme, statutory
enactments|then this could have ramications for a number of important settings in which positive
political theory ndings are applied to consequential political decisions.
First, beliefs about the impact of separation of powers on legislative output may aect deci-
sions about constitutional design. While the main features of the U.S. Constitution (particularly
its legislative institutions) have proven remarkably durable, the wave of constitution-making and
constitution-revising around the world over the past generation has highlighted the fact that in
many countries basic issues of constitutional structure have contemporary and ongoing salience.
Indeed, ideas about the separation of powers, including those traditionally attributed to the Framers
of the U.S. Constitution (and often propounded by U.S. consultants and advisors), have allegedly
played a role in some of these contemporary cases of constitutional drafting and reform (deLisle
1999; Robinson 1992; Schwartz 2009; Siegan 1994) (but see Tushnet (2008)).
Second, even when changes to the basic constitutional structure are o the table|as they proba-
bly are in the United States, at least in the short-to-medium term|there are numerous smaller-scale
institutional design choices that bear directly on the degree of legislative fragmentation (Vermeule
2007). This category might include debates over the libuster (Alter and McGranahan 2000; Wawro
and Schickler 2006), as well as proposals for super-majority rules in other contexts (McGinnis and
Rappaport 1999; Garrett 1999). A parallel analysis might also apply to the regulatory process,
where non-constitutional choices about administrative procedure aect the degree to which a par-
ticular administration or interest group can secure or block changes in regulatory policy (Givati
and Stephenson 2011; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1989; McGarity 1992).
Third, beliefs about the intent and eect of constitutional provisions pertaining to separation
26of powers may aect judicial approaches to both constitutional and statutory interpretation. In
the constitutional context, beliefs about the intent or purpose of a constitution's separation-of-
powers provisions may inuence how judges interpret and enforce those provisions (Clark 2001;
Eskridge and Ferejohn 1992; Strauss 1987). In the statutory context, many prominent scholars
and jurists have argued that judges should adopt interpretive methods that reinforce the purposes
of the constitutional lawmaking structure, including stability and compromise (Easterbrook 1983,
1994; Manning 2001, 2007); others have argued for dierent, more exible interpretive methods,
precisely because the constitutional lawmaking scheme is thought to produce excessive stasis oth-
erwise (Breyer 1992; Calabresi 1982; Eskridge 1988).
This paper takes no position on the normative implications of the positive analysis. Even if
future research empirically substantiates the model's predictions|including the counter-intuitive
nding that increasing legislative fragmentation can sometimes reduce rather than increase both
policy stability and policy moderation|this would not necessarily bolster or undermine the case for
such fragmentation. Such a nding would, however, substantially revise the terms of the normative
debate. If stability, moderation, and compromise are desirable, then in some situations a polity
might be better o concentrating legislative power, perhaps by reducing the number of veto players
or facilitating their circumvention. If the polity is plagued by excessive stasis, or if it would be
socially desirable for elected representatives to pursue bold but controversial policy initiatives with
long-term eects, then greater separation of legislative power might be a good thing, precisely
because it attenuates the implicit threat of repeal that hangs over every such initiative. Moreover,
the non-monotonicity highlighted by the model implies that prescriptive advice must be more
nuanced and context-specic: if one wants to increase (or decrease) stability and moderation, one
cannot know whether greater fragmentation of legislative power will help or hurt unless one can
make a plausible conjecture about which part of the parameter space the polity currently occupies.
Conclusion
This paper developed a simple formal model that calls into question the conventional wisdom that
greater separation of powers leads to greater policy stability (that is, fewer changes from the status
quo) and greater policy moderation (that is, policies that involve less extreme redistribution from
27\losers" to \winners"). This conventional wisdom is based on the eminently reasonable conjecture
that greater separation of powers increases the expected number of parties or interest groups with
the ability to veto any new legislative proposal. When many groups have a veto, proponents of the
new legislation must buy them o by making concessions. Sometimes, though, it is impossible or
not worthwhile for proponents to make sucient concessions to secure enactment, in which case
the status quo will persist even though a statute might have passed if legislative power were more
concentrated.
This conventional analysis is not wrong, but it overlooks a second consideration: parties and
interest groups care about insulating favorable legislation against future repeal, and the same
separation-of-powers institutions that make enactment dicult also make repeal dicult. It follows
that an increase in the fragmentation of legislative power (for example, due to an increase in the
number of veto players, or to the imposition of a super-majority voting rule) will have two cross-
cutting eects on the stability and moderation of policy outcomes. On the one hand, greater
fragmentation makes it more dicult for any one faction to push through extreme legislation.
On the other hand, greater fragmentation attenuates the threat of repeal, which gives a faction
that nds itself able to push through extreme legislation a stronger incentive to do so, rather
than to enact a more moderate statute. The result, at least for certain types of statute, is a
non-monotonic relationship between the fragmentation of legislative power and the stability and
moderation of legislative policy. In unitary systems, the government is institutionally unconstrained
at the time of enactment, but the implicit threat of repeal may induce inaction or compromise. For
\intermediate" levels of legislative fragmentation, the implied threat of repeal is no longer sucient
to deter a unied government from enacting extreme policies, but unied governments still occur
with sucient frequency that the polity enacts such extreme policies relatively often. For high
levels of fragmentation, where each major interest group is essentially guaranteed a veto, policy is
likely to be both very stable and very moderate, in that only consensus statutes can ever pass.
It remains an open question whether this theoretical prediction is empirically signicant. That
said, many basic features of the model, as well as important aspects of the model's predictions,
are broadly consistent with the admittedly scant existing empirical evidence. If the theoretical
argument sketched here turns out to be more accurate than the theoretical conjecture sketched
by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution and the modern social scientists who have followed them,
28then many familiar arguments|not only in academic analysis, but in practical debates over con-
stitutional design, institutional reform, and jurisprudence|may need substantial revision.
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